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Lawrie Balfour, Benjamin Hertzberg, Jack Knight and Cara Wong offer comments on my book, The Imperative of
Integration, that raise critically important questions about the ways a pragmatist methodology should treat ideals in
non-ideal theory. In this article, I reply to their comments as well as provide some reflections on the proper level
of abstraction in non-ideal theory and on what kinds of results we can expect from it.
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I thank my critics for their thoughtful and insightful comments on my book. Issues of
methodology, particularly the place of non-ideal theory, loom large in their comments.
Hence it is appropriate to begin with Jack Knight’s contribution, since he offers the most
systematic discussion of non-ideal theory. We share a pragmatist orientation. In general,
pragmatists have spent far more time talking about methodology than putting it into
practice. This misplaces priorities, since pragmatists hold that methodology is vindicated
by showing what it achieves in practice. For this reason, my book stresses showing over
saying what pragmatist methodology does. Knight does a superb job of articulating
aspects of our shared methodology that remain implicit in my book.
Knight’s insightful discussion illuminates two distinctions, which I unfortunately did
not draw in my book: first, between abstract moral principles and ideal-typical models of
institutions, and second, between ideal-typical models and their concrete realization
under particular empirical conditions. Consider abstract principles first. Many philoso-
phers aspire to discover normative principles that purport to be true in all possible worlds,
regardless of the facts (Cohen, 2003). Such principles might be for conduct – for
example, the principle of utility, or Kant’s categorical imperative. Or they might be
purely evaluative – for example, the luck egalitarian principle that it is bad if anyone is
worse off than anyone else due to brute luck. I don’t think we should place any
confidence in our ability to arrive at such principles, supposing they existed. Even if we
could do so, all of the hard work would still remain in figuring out how to apply them
in practice (Dewey and Tufts, 1981 [1932], p. 178). In the process of extreme abstraction
to supposedly pure principles, and then moving back down to application, we also risk
missing out on normatively significant problems and questions of feasibility, and tend to
skip over the hard but indispensable work of providing an institutional analysis of our
problems (Anderson, 2010, pp. 3–6).
At a lower level of abstraction, some theorists advance ideal principles such as equality
of opportunity and color-blindness. Such principles presuppose certain background
institutions. The principle of equality of opportunity presupposes a division of labor with
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different benefits attached to different occupations, and a labor market able to draw talent
from mobile workers across a geographical region. The principle (unlike the ideal) of
color-blindness presupposes the existence of racial identities. Although theory at this level
of abstraction presupposes institutions, normative justifications of such principles gener-
ally set aside questions of how such principles could be institutionally embodied, whether
this is feasible, or whether it would be desirable to institutionalize them once we examine
what this would require. Notoriously, the principle of equality of opportunity is incom-
patible with anything resembling current family structures, and perhaps any feasible
childrearing arrangements, but little work has been done thinking through a reassessment
of the principle in light of these facts, or in analyzing what it would really take to
institutionalize it or some more acceptable successor principle.
Knight correctly argues that pragmatists prefer to work at a still lower level of
abstraction, with ideal-typical models of institutions. These are what I call ‘ideals’ in my
book. We have ideals of things such as free markets and democracy, which may be
complex and include sub-ideals. For example, democracy includes an ideal of equal
citizenship. I propose an ideal of integration as a constitutive ideal of democracy. The
normative justification of such ideals depends on their consequences. Hence, ideal types
need not only satisfy normative desiderata (the consequences they are predicted to deliver
must be good), but also explanatory ones: the ideal type needs to model adequately key
causal powers and tendencies of its actual instantiations, under specified conditions. Such
ideals can therefore be tested in practice.
The concrete institutional embodiments of ideal types include many contingencies and
empirical limitations. Ideals are multiply realizable; particular realizations exhibit path-
dependency and other constraints. What we actually test in practice are not the ideals
directly, but their institutional embodiments under particular conditions. A major ana-
lytical task is to figure out enough about how institutions work to attribute desired or
undesired consequences to the ideal type we are trying to realize, or to contingent
features of the practice or its background conditions that we might be able to change.
Such causal attributions are themselves susceptible to further rounds of testing, in the
course of which we may refine our ideal types through greater specification. (Think, for
example, of how ideals of democratic representation are refined and more fully specified
once we include political parties in our models of democracy.)
It follows that ideals are always works in progress, and that initial experiments in
particular ideals may properly lead to the refinement rather than the rejection of an ideal
if the first attempt at implementation fails. In my book, I illustrate this point through an
examination of initial post-Reconstruction understandings of what equal citizenship
would amount to for freed people in the United States. Initial understandings supposed
that the relevant ideal of equality would include equality of civil rights without equality
of political rights or the vote. That turned out to be an illusion: there could be no real
equality of civil rights without equality of political rights. This expanded our ideal of
equal citizenship in ways that also fostered the struggle for women’s suffrage (Anderson,
2010, pp. 89–95).
Similar points could be made about the ideal of free labor. The abolition of slavery
was initially anticipated to mark a triumphant crossing from slavery to freedom in the
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organization of labor. As we now know, the passage of the 13th Amendment only
initiated the struggle for a fully free labor regime rather than marking its achievement.
This was not only due to massive resistance by former slaveholders intent on re-imposing
the functional equivalent of slavery on freed blacks. Continued political struggles against
former slaveholders also highlighted injustices in the legal regime regulating supposedly
free white laborers. Members of all races have litigated claims under the 13th Amend-
ment, and have pressed for numerous other laws protecting workers. The struggle for free
labor is continuing even to this day, as is manifest in workers’ claims against employer
governance of their lives both on and off the job, with respect to sexual autonomy, access
to contraception, privacy, freedom of speech and political activity, and so on.
Benjamin Hertzberg rightly argues that ideals, to perform their critical function, need
to abstract and idealize. Knight’s discussion of ideal types explains how non-ideal theory
treats abstraction and idealization in a disciplined way. Hertzberg also argues that ideals
need to stand at some critical distance from hypothetical solutions to problems because
what counts as a problem is dependent on the normative content of the ideal, which may
be controversial. I agree with Hertzberg that the articulation of problems is dependent on
ideals that are often controversial. The ideals of democracy, free labor and racial
integration have long been sites of contestation and remain so today, even among those
who nominally sign on to them. Hertzberg objects that my analogy of non-ideal theory
to medical diagnosis of health problems fails to reflect this since health is an
uncontroversial ideal and what counts as a health problem follows clearly from this ideal.
To be sure, health is a more fully specified and consensual ideal than many political ideals,
but even here there are controversies: for example, whether being medically ‘overweight’
is unhealthy, whether disabilities are innate defects of individuals or products of ill-
adjusted institutions, and whether people who express transgender identities are mentally
ill. The differences between ideals of health and other normative ideals are more a matter
of degree than of kind.
More importantly, Hertzberg wants political theory to support ideals in a more utopian
mode than what can be supported by investigating already felt distress by subjects on the
ground. Sometimes the status quo starts feeling problematic only against a novel ideal that
might not be proposed as a practical alternative, but as an evaluative point of view from
which to cast a critical light on society. Rousseau’s romantic ideal of the noble savage
exemplifies this strategy: the point is to see how corrupt and diminishing civilization is,
where everyone lives through the eyes of others, by contrast with an ideal of the
psychically self-sufficient individual who lives without envy or spite towards others. Yet
Rousseau’s prescription for the distress generated by our recognizing the gap between our
current condition and his romantic ideal is a democratic one in which the need for
recognition is not transcended, but rather satisfied in a society of equals.
Hertzberg identifies an interesting role for ideals of this sort in political theory –
namely to criticize those who claim to uphold such ideals, but disregard what it would
take to realize them. Hertzberg objects that I neglect the critical uses of purely evaluative
ideals, and in particular of the color-blind ideal, which could be deployed to bring its
advocates on board with my integrationist project. I’ll speak first to the particular claim,
and then to the general one. While Hertzberg may be right that a critical use of the
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color-blind ideal might bring around its advocates, I worry that invocation of the ideal
invites conceptual and normative confusion. This is why, in my book, I disaggregate
the color-blind ideal by distinguishing several concepts of race operative in current
practice to which we might become blind, and show that each points to a very differ-
ent normative concern. I thus replace the critical function of the color-blind ideal
with several more precisely articulated ideals, while showing why its deployment
against integrative programs such as affirmative action is confused (Anderson, 2010,
pp. 157–177).
Is there a general role for utopian critical-evaluative ideals in political theory? I am
not confident in armchair speculation about what a perfect society would involve.
Normative judgments may be used to guide either conduct or feeling. If they guide
conduct, they are practical; if they guide feeling alone, they are purely evaluative. Most
philosophers test purely evaluative judgments in thought experiments: we imagine the
state that is judged to be good, and consider whether we intuitively like or approve of
it. However, from a pragmatist point of view, the ultimate evidence for evaluative
judgments lies in actual experiments: how would we feel about the state if we actually
experienced it (Dewey, 1976 [1915], pp. 16–17)? The difficulty with thought experi-
ments is that we are not very good at forecasting our feelings about not-yet-
experienced states (Gilbert, 2006). The history of politics is littered with attempts
to realize imagined utopias that turned out badly, not just because of unforeseen
consequences, but because anticipated consequences that people imagined would be
wonderful were experienced as horrible in real life.
I’m not knocking the role of dreams in politics. Visionaries have often played
powerful, positive roles in history, inspiring people to aspire to progressive ideals not
imagined before. It isn’t clear to me, however, that the academic political theorist is in
a good position to generate them. Dreams can neither be deduced nor justified from
theoretical principles or methods. This is why I leave the ultimate fate of the ideal of
color-blindness – understood as complete transcendence of racial identities – up to the
inclinations of members of a free society of equals, who may or may not choose to
identify along the ancestral lines that race defines today (Anderson, 2010, pp. 177–9).
Once a polity becomes dissatisfied by contrasting its condition with some critical-
evaluative ideal, the theorist can move in and consider what institutional arrangements
might satisfactorily address the newly felt dissatisfactions. As Rousseau shows, and as
Hertzberg argues with respect to the color-blind ideal, these arrangements need not
consist in attempts to implement the ideal in question directly. In all cases, however,
vindication of any ideal must be found in the experiences of those who live according
to it – not in a priori argument.
Hertzberg suggests that distributive egalitarian ideals might, in their critical-evaluative
function, make people feel that income inequality is objectionable. I doubt that many
people other than theorists are much moved by a priori normative arguments of ideal
distributive justice. Rather, income inequality comes to seem a problem for people when
its causes and distressing consequences are exposed: when people see that the reason they
make so much less than others is that the rules of the economic game have been rigged
against them, or that distributive inequality helps explain why political processes have
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been captured by the rich, why their employer feels free to abuse them at work, why
they are working harder but making less, and why they can’t get health insurance.
Knight’s account shows that testing ideals in practice is messy. Institutional embodi-
ments of our ideals cannot live up to our highest hopes for them. At best they deliver
improvements, even while they suffer from numerous imperfections and disappoint-
ments. And, as Knight wisely argues, enduring tensions in our ideals, such as between
freedom and equality, are incapable of purely theoretical resolution.
Lawrie Balfour’s comments fit into these points. It is possible to hope and strive for
ideal forms of national identification that can overcome internal divisions within a polity.
The 14th Amendment’s definition of citizenship based on territorial birthright was
designed to promote this end. But solutions to one problem can fail to solve others.
Territorially based birthright citizenship did not work for Asian immigrants. Furthermore,
legal institutions do not dictate cultural understandings of national identity, which, as
Balfour rightly argues, are often parochial and prejudiced.
Every form of in-group identification generates out-group identities and hence poten-
tial injustices. Yet we can hardly do without in-group identification. It is deeply
embedded in human psychology, and essential to forging the ties of trust and loyalty
essential to successfully functioning cooperative institutions. Liberal democratic politics is
inextricably bounded by nation-states, however much liberal theory neglects the socio-
logical conditions of its practice (Calhoun, 2007). Balfour reinforces Knight’s point that
some tensions of normative ideals are incapable of theoretical resolution, and that even
in practice the best we can do is balance competing values, with inevitable losses along
the way.
I disagree with two of Balfour’s claims. First, my critique of reparations is not that it
is backward-looking. On my account of injustice, the causal history of a current state of
affairs is highly relevant to judging whether it is unjust (Anderson, 2010, pp. 16–21). My
critique of reparations is rather that, in the context of continuing unjust segregation, their
positive effects will drain away, like water through a sieve. White society would regard
reparations as closing the book on a racial injustice conceived as exclusively inhabiting
the past, while washing its hands of its continuing systematic operation (Anderson, 2010,
p. 229, n. 19).
Second, Balfour suggests that we scale back our ambitions to a modest ideal of
desegregation, in recognition of the disappointing history of Americans in remaking
ourselves as an integrated whole, and of the personal dilemma that blacks confront in the
prospect of integration. Certainly, the actual attempted embodiment of any ideal always
falls short of our best hopes for it. This is no less true for racial integration than it was
for abolition. Balfour eloquently articulates additional reasons for worrying about the
costs of an integration agenda for blacks. Nevertheless, I am reluctant to scale back. All
great ideals of justice require enduring struggle even in the face of repeated disappoint-
ment. The struggles for democracy and free labor have taken hundreds of years, and are
still continuing. The same is true for racial equality.
Cara Wong highlights empirical challenges to defining and realizing racial integration.
Levels of integration vary depending on the scale of analysis, and pose different chal-
lenges depending on the setting. It is harder to promote integration on a nationwide
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scale, when many states are 90 per cent white or more, than in diverse metropolitan
areas. Integration of organizations administered by central authorities, such as the mili-
tary, workplaces and universities, is easier than integrating neighborhoods and intimate
private relations. This is not just an empirical observation; it also has normative weight.
The ideal of integration is in tension with principles of freedom of association in private
life. Contention over where the boundaries of private life lie has been part of the civil
rights struggle, but the law has obvious limitations when it comes to promoting inte-
gration of friendship circles and marriages. Some tasks can only be undertaken in civil
society – not mandated by law. Yet centrally administered organizations can arrange their
operations to facilitate, if not mandate, integration in more intimate settings. While
interracial friendships may be less stable than intraracial friendships, some colleges, such as
Harvard, have altered their dormitory assignment policies in ways that promote racial
integration of college housing. The effects, while not perfect, nevertheless improve upon
what would otherwise be a segregated default position.
Wong provides evidence that an adequate causal analysis of dynamics of segregation
must consider gaps between subjective conceptions and perceptions of integration and
the objective measures provided by demographers. Her suggestion is useful as a warning
against mistaken causal models, and because it may generate alternative integration
strategies: if whites flee certain areas because they perceive them to be more ‘black’ than
they really are, there may be ways to make the actual demographics of an area more
salient in ways that reduce white flight. Nevertheless, all integration strategies must take
note of the trade-off Wong notes between comfort (of homophily) and diminished
ethnocentrism (brought by integration). In my book, I allow that disadvantaged groups
need self-segregated spaces, in part to enable disadvantaged groups to cope with the
stresses of integration (Anderson, 2010, pp. 183–4). The ideal of integration, while
demanding, is not full-time. As with all ideals that stand in tension to each other, the
better options generally call for striking a balance.
I resist two of Wong’s suggestions. First, she claims that promoting integration in
major metropolitan areas will have no effects in nearly all-white states. Opportunities
are most abundant and visible in major metropolitan areas. Routine integration of
blacks in more prestigious positions in metro areas can alter racial stereotypes nation-
wide because metropolitan conditions tend to be more salient at the national level. In
addition, there is evidence that living in a jurisdiction led by an elected black politician
softens white racial attitudes – at least among Democrats and independents (Hajnal,
2001). Although President Barack Obama was elected on an implicit condition of
avoiding racial politics, his election may well have effects beyond whatever policies
Obama advances. All of this may seem like weak tea given the gigantic structural
obstacles to nationwide integration. As Wong observes, the power of overwhelmingly
white, low-population states is constitutionally entrenched in the structure of the
Senate. Plainly, integration cannot solve all racial problems. The Constitution has had
to be amended at least four times (13th–15th and 24th Amendments, arguably also the
23rd Amendment) to deal with egregious racial inequalities, and innumerable other
measures must be taken as well. Nothing in pragmatism guarantees that all problems
have complete, feasible solutions.
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Second, Wong suggests a trade-off between descriptive representation and influence.
Black majority districts guarantee maximum descriptive representation, but at the cost of
influence, as such districting delivers the remaining electoral districts disproportionately to
overwhelmingly white districts liable to elect candidates that play to white racial preju-
dice. I reply that descriptive representation is essential for influence. A group of all white
officeholders will tend to neglect black interests compared to an integrated group of
officeholders due to the former’s insularity and ignorance of specifically black concerns.
Moreover, the trade-off Wong points to has become far less stark over time as white
voting patterns have become less racially polarized. There are vastly more whites willing
to vote for a black candidate than in 1965, and there is reason to expect these trends to
continue. This is a reason to relax majority-minority districting goals in favor of districts
in which blacks exercise substantial electoral influence even though they are in a minority
(Pildes, 2002).
I conclude by noting common themes in my critics’ comments. All rightly stress the
gap between high ideals and messy reality, and the tensions between conflicting norma-
tive ideals. I emphasize Knight’s point that pragmatist methodology is designed to cope
with these gaps and tensions, which cannot be resolved theoretically but are managed in
practices that only incompletely realize our aspirations. The promise of pragmatist
methodology is that it provides tools for learning from these incomplete realizations,
helping us to reshape our ideals in the face of practice, and our practices in light of our
ideals, with the aim of improvement – not perfection.
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